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On Aug. 1, 2014, Argentina 
defaulted to its creditors for the 
second time in the past 13 years. 
It was the rather predictable 
conclusion to a lawsuit that had 
spanned years and involved the 
hedge funds that held the original 
bonds, on which the country had 
defaulted in 2001. After the first 
default, Argentina unilaterally 
restructured these bonds in both 
2005 and 2010, ultimately 
promising to pay back 35 cents 
per dollar. Many accepted this 
offer, but it failed to appease 
several hedge funds, which 
demanded that Argentina repay 
the full amount. Spearheading the 
fight was Elliott Management 
Corporation, led by Paul Singer.1 
Argentina argued that Elliott had 
purposely bought discounted 
bonds for $48.7 million, though 
according to the government, the 
bonds were worth $832 million.2 
 August’s default is simply 
another chapter in a saga that 
stretches back over the past 
century. In the late 19th century 
and in the beginning of the 20th 
century, Argentina enjoyed great 
wealth, but faulty economic policy 
and constant political violence 
destroyed a once prosperous 
nation. A series of military coups 
led to the election of Juan Perón, 
the leader immortalized in the 
musical Evita, whose name still 
lends itself to the political ideology 
that influenced the presidents in 
office during the past two defaults. 
Although lauded as a populist 
movement and a vast departure 
from the military regime that 
dominated Argentine politics, 
Perón’s policies and ideas, as 
followed by current President 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
and former President Carlos 
Menem, led to the two respective 
defaults of the past decade.  
 “Peronism” was an idea 
born in tumultuous times, but 
militaristic juntas didn’t always 
dominate Argentina. The period of 
the late 19th to the early 20th 
century up until the First World 
War was a golden age in 
Argentina. President Julio 
Argentino Roca, who served from 
1880 to 1886, advocated policies 
that made Argentina a player in 
the world economy. Its exports 
were largely agricultural goods, 
and its imports were consumer 
goods, technology and capital. 
Although this hurt the lower 
working class and the money that 
flowed in from international trade 
went directly to those in power, the 
argument for this economic model 
was that the country was simply 
pursuing its competitive advantage 
in the marketplace.  It was 
cheaper to buy certain goods 
abroad than to produce them at 
home. Nevertheless, this created a 
nationalist anti-foreign sentiment 
against Great Britain in particular, 
which would last for years. Great 
Britain made up 20 percent of 
Argentina’s exports in 1887, and 
nearly double that in imports. By 
the outbreak of World War I in 
1914, agricultural goods 
accounted for 90 percent of the 
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country’s imports, and 85 percent 
of those were sent to Europe.3 
 During this golden age, 
GDP growth led the world at the 
time, an impressive six percent per 
year. Immigrants flooded in from 
Europe in search of work on the 
pampas, where the fertile fields 
and cattle ranches fueled the 
roaring and robust engine that was 
the Argentine economy. The influx 
of people from places such as 
Wales, Germany and France gave 
this economy a larger workforce 
and produced a unique culture 
reminiscent of that of a European 
nation.4 It was one of the 10 
richest nations in the world, behind 
Australia, Britain and the United 
States, but before France, 
Germany and Italy. However, 
trade toppled after the First World 
War. As foreign investment 
returned to investors’ respective 
home nations, local banks were 
too few and short on capital to 
make up for it. A second critical 
issue was that the economy 
centered on commodities, as 
Argentina wasn’t an industrialized 
nation. The only technology that it 
had access to during La Belle 
Epoqué — the golden age — was 
railroads. The development of 
technology wasn’t one of its 
specialties, partially because 
education was limited to the 
oligarchy, and it was in the 
oligarchy’s interests for Argentina 
to remain an agrarian power rather 
than an industrial one.5 
Accompanying the creation of 
factories would be the creation of 
a new middle class that owned the 
factories, which would loosen the 
grip of the wealthy landowners in 
the pampas on the political and 
economic power they enjoyed. Not 
surprisingly, this concentration of 
wealth and power, instead of 
maintaining the status quo, may 
have led to its demise. Change of 
any sort would shake the 
foundations of this upper class’ 
very comfortable position, which is 
why the oligarchy was so against 
an industrialized economy. 
 Perhaps the clearest 
forerunner to the Peronist Party 
was the Unión Cívica Radical 
(UCR), which came into power 
after World War I. Its founders 
were largely middle class, and its 
platform was fair, universal 
elections and revolutionary 
change. Like Peronism, there was 
no clear ideological framework: Its 
constituents were the collective 
people, and its goal was to 
transform the nation and create a 
“fairer” society. Party leader 
Hipólito Yrigoyen was the first 
president elected under universal 
male suffrage in 1916.  However, 
his administration did more to 
support the status quo than to alter 
it. One accomplishment was 
strengthening the idea of import 
substitution, which is something 
that Perón would establish as the 
country’s main economic policy in 
the future. This strategy was 
designed to shift Argentina away 
from dependency on foreign goods 
and instead help to build industry 
of its own through tariffs or quotas 
to discourage foreign investment. 
In his second term, Yrigoyen tried 
to fully nationalize the oil industry 
under the state oil company, 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales 
(YPF). In order to garner support 
for this motion, he ran anti-U.S. 
and, in particular, anti-Standard Oil 
propaganda, but he faced both 
political and economic difficulties. 
The lack of congressional backing 
and the unfeasibility of YPF being 
able to shoulder domestic demand 
led to imminent failure. Yrigoyen’s 
unpopularity combined with the 
beginning of the Great Depression 
resulted in his removal from power 
in a coup d’etat orchestrated by 
General José Félix Uriburu.  
Uriburu began his 
presidency addressing Argentina’s 
economic woes. He slashed 
spending and fashioned public 
works programs in an attempt to 
lower unemployment. He too, 
however, was as unpopular as his 
predecessor was, and attempted 
to mitigate this through oppression 
and the dissolution of Congress. 
After two years, Agustín Pedro 
Justo, another military general, 
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replaced him. Justo was a 
member of a political coalition 
known as the Concordancia, which 
was infamous for rising to power 
through electoral fraud. 6  
 In 1943, the Concordancia 
was overthrown by another coup, 
this one instigated by Grupo de 
Oficiales Unidos (GOU), the 
United Officers’ Group, a secret 
society of Argentine army officers. 
Among their ranks was Colonel 
Juan Perón, who was largely 
regarded as the head of the 
operation. As Secretary of Labor, 
he took a vested interest in the 
welfare of the working class 
counter to the attitude that many 
presidents took of maintaining the 
current order. As a result, it was 
the labor force that made up his 
largest base of support when he 
ran for president three years later.  
 It was from Perón’s first 
term that most of the party’s 
philosophy is drawn. He shaped a 
Five-Year Economic Plan with the 
intention of fully industrializing the 
nation and eliminating reliance 
upon foreign exports. There was a 
fundamental disconnect between 
the plan and the reality: Perón had 
risen to the office of president 
through anti-foreign rhetoric and 
nationalist sentiment, but some 
degree of foreign investment was 
still needed in order for the 
economy to flourish. A year before 
his election, Spruille Braden, the 
U.S. ambassador to Argentina, 
denounced Perón’s “neurotic 
nationalism,” which even into his 
presidency strained the 
relationship between the two 
nations.7 
 It’s from this history of 
advocating Argentine interests and 
nationalization of industry that 
many of de Kirchner’s policies are 
derived. The most striking was the 
partial re-nationalization of YPF in 
2012. Although the government 
only holds a controlling stake and 
not the entire company, the action 
still reaped criticism from the 
European Union. The 2001 default 
virtually shut Argentina off from 
credit markets, and the recent fight 
with Elliott Management and de 
Kirchner’s characterization of 
foreign bondholders as “vultures” 
did no favors in repairing its 
international standing.8 Even now, 
Argentina has taken a firm 
nationalist stance in foreign policy, 
in an attempt to save its crumbling 
economy. 
 In order to improve its 
financial position, Argentina must 
be willing to relinquish its past 
views on economic dogma. Since 
Perón, and, to an extent even 
before him, Argentina has allowed 
anti-foreign sentiments to fester, 
which in effect has stifled its 
economic growth as a nation. In 
2007, it was ruled against in a 
case concerning it and the British 
natural gas company BG Group. 
The U.S. Supreme Court had 
previously ruled in favor of BG 
Group, which claimed that the 
country was attempting to force it 
out of business, likely in an 
attempt to help the domestic 
natural gas business. Instead of 
accepting the ruling, it returned to 
U.S. court to appeal the 
international court’s decision.9 In 
the end, the Supreme Court 
upheld it, but this is a prime 
example of the economic friction 
that exists between Argentina and 
other countries. The only way 
forward is to thaw the ice that has 
frozen trade relations. 
Argentina must attract 
foreign investment while at the 
same time preserving its own 
advantages in the world 
marketplace. Even today, one of 
its biggest exports is commodities, 
exports of which are almost 14 
percent of the economy.10 
However, technology is key to 
building any advanced economy, 
but to gain technology it must 
become an inviting place for tech 
companies. One of the ways in 
which it may do this is by 
incentivizing investment in 
industry. This was done in May 
2014 with the biofuel industry. 
Export taxes were cut from 21 
percent to 11 percent on 
alternative fuel. The biggest 
players in this industry are 
international grain companies 
Cargill, Bunge and Louis 
Dreyfus.11 Such policies could 
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increase output and keep foreign 
companies in Argentina, which 
benefits the economy as a whole. 
The immigrants that 
flooded into Argentina during its 
golden age once built its then-
robust economy and kept it going. 
This necessary today, though in a 
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